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Abstract
Certain parts of the international tax system are largely unexplored from a structural perspective. One
prominent example is the asymmetric tax treaty network, i.e., the network that consists of bilateral tax treaties
concluded between developed and emerging countries on the basis of the OECD Model Tax Convention on
Income and on Capital (OECD model). The relative size of this network is substantial. For instance, the
United States´ asymmetric tax treaty network represents about 53% of its entire tax treaty network.
This Article offers a structural analysis of the asymmetric tax treaty network. It answers two fundamental
questions. First, it elaborates a theory for explaining why a representative emerging country is willing to
conclude tax treaties with developed countries on the basis of the OECD model. Second, this Article extends
that theory to understand the dynamics of tax treaty interpretation in the emerging world. This extension aims
to illuminate the incentive structure that the courts of a representative emerging country normally have when
construing OECD-based tax treaties in the foreign direct investment (FDI) area. Game theory is used as a
theoretical framework for answering both questions.
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I- Introduction
The performance of the developing world in the global economy over the last decades is
unprecedented since the industrial revolution. In the 18 centuries until 1820, developing
countries produced, on average, around 80% of the global economic output.2 But
developing countries were then left behind by Europe's industrial revolution in the 19th
Century, and by 1950, developing countries´ share had fallen to 40% of global output.3
However, the developed countries´ dominance of the global economy since the industrial
revolution may be over. In 2005, the combined output of developing countries rose above
half of the global total.4 This growth is broadly spread: Brazil, China, India and Russia
account for only two-fifths of emerging-world output.5
Developing countries have become increasingly important markets for companies from the
developed world: over half of the combined exports of the European Union, Japan and the
United States of America go to emerging economies. Moreover, the rich economies´ trade
with emerging economies is growing twice as fast as their trade with one another.6
The increasing economic interaction between the developed and developing worlds is
producing a number of consequences.7 These include the growing relevance of those parts
of international law that link both worlds, such as the asymmetric tax treaty network. The
asymmetric tax treaty network consists of bilateral tax treaties concluded between
developed and developing countries. The word “asymmetric” denotes unequal investment
flows between contracting states: while developing countries normally are capital
importers, developed countries habitually are capital exporters. The United Kingdom-Chile
tax treaty is an example of an asymmetric tax treaty because investment flows between
those two contracting states are presumably unequal.
The asymmetric tax treaty network of leading developed countries is substantial. For
example, the United Kingdom’s asymmetric tax treaty network represents about 73% of its
whole tax treaty network, and the United States’ asymmetric tax treaty network represents
about 53 % of its entire tax treaty network. 8
2

Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, Development Centre Studies, OECD
2001, at 27 (maintaining that “in the year 1000, Asia (except Japan) produced more than two thirds of world
GDP, Western Europe less than 9 percent. In 1820 the proportions were 56 and 24 per cent respectively. In
1998, the Asian share was about 30 per cent compared with 46 per cent for Western Europe and Western
Offshoots combined”).
3
Emerging Economies. Climbing back, The Economist, 69-70, January 21, 2006 (arguing that “since their
industrial revolutions in the 19th century, the rich countries of the ´first world´ have dominated the global
economy. By one measure at least, that era may be over. According to estimates by The Economist, in 2005
the combined output of emerging (or developing) economies rose above half of the global total”).
4
Emerging economies, note _ , ibidem (measuring the growth of the global economic output in purchasingpower parity).
5
The Balance of Economic Power in the World is Changing, The Economist, at 13, September 16, 2006.
6
The New Titans. A Survey of the World Economy, The Economist, 3-4, September 16, 2006.
7
See, for example, Dancing with Giants: China, India and the Global Economy, World Bank, forthcoming
(arguing that China and India may influence global norms, tastes, business models, and so forth).
8
See Section II.
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The asymmetric and symmetric9 tax treaty networks constitute the core structure of the
international tax system.10 Both networks are fundamentally based on a single bilateral tax
treaty model designed in the early 20th Century and embodied in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital
(OECD model) since 1963.11
This Article offers an answer to two fundamental questions about the asymmetric tax treaty
network. First, it elaborates a theory for explaining why a representative developing
country is willing to conclude tax treaties with developed countries on the basis of the
OECD model. This first question is crucial for understanding the emergence of the
asymmetric tax treaty network since the OECD model presupposes a number of elements
that are regularly absent in the developing world.12 Second, this Article endeavours to
explain the structure of incentives that the courts of a representative developing country
normally has when construing OECD-based tax treaties in the foreign direct investment
(FDI) area. This second question is relevant to understanding the evolution of the
asymmetric tax treaty network given that, for example, case law may be relevant in tax
treaty renegotiation. Game theory is used as a theoretical framework for answering both
questions.

9

The symmetric tax treaty network refers to tax treaties in which there are approximately equal investment
flows between contracting states. Tax treaties concluded between developed countries (such as the US-UK tax
treaty) or between developing countries (such as the Argentine-Brazilian tax treaty) are examples of
symmetric tax treaties.
10
The literature on the international tax regime is broad and deep; only certain elements can be highlighted
here. Excellent recent surveys of the entire international tax regime are the following: Diane Ring,
International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications, Tax Law Review (Fall 2006/Winter 2007) (Ring offers
a theory for explaining when and under what circumstances countries are able to reach agreement on conflicts
over international taxation). Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallisation — realities,
experiences and opportunities, 56 Tax Law Review 259 (2003). Brauner outlines a general conceptual
framework for achieving a world tax regime via a multilateral tax treaty that might be implemented in stages.
Ian Roxan, Limits to Globalization — Some implications for taxation in the developing world (2003)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author). Roxan does not share the negative view of the effects of
globalization on taxation in the developing world. Michael Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate
Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 Tax Law Review 261 (2001), which argues
that the current international income tax regime lacks a satisfactory normative basis. Richard Vann,
International Aspects of Income Tax, in Tax Law Design and Drafting, (International Monetary Fund,
Volume 2, 719-810, 1998). Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: a Proposal for
Simplification, 74 Texas Law Review 1301 (1996), which, as its title indicates, identifies the structure of international taxation and its normative underpinnings. Sol Piccioto, International Business Taxation, A Study
in the Internationalization of Business Regulation (1992), which is an historical account of the evolution of
corporate income taxation. Adrian Ogley, The Principles of International Tax: a Multinational Perspective
(1993), which provides a brief and illuminating general overview.
11
For a detailed analysis of the OECD Model, see Philip Baker, Double Taxation Conventions. A Manual on
the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003.
12
See Section V. See also Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Transfer Pricing Problem: A Proposal for Simplification,
The Tax Lawyer, Winter 2006, forthcoming (arguing that the OECD model presupposes two major elements:
i) symmetric flow of cross border income between tax treaty partners; ii) a decentralized network of domestic
courts capable of producing case law with public good features).
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The two inquiries referred to in the previous paragraph are related to each other. This is so
because this paper assumes that the same strategic interaction among developing countries
in international taxation explains both the emergence and evolution of the asymmetric tax
treaty network.13 I will leave for another day the issue of what explains the emergence and
evolution of the OECD model and the symmetric tax treaty network.
The Article is divided into six parts. After this introduction, Part II focuses on two
conceptual elements. First, it defines competition within a compatible standard (as
something different from competition between incompatible standards). Second, it
addresses one major consequence of competition within a compatible standard: the
emergence of network markets such as the telephone system.
Part III studies the strategic interaction among representative developing countries in the
area of international taxation (the first strategic interaction). Part III maintains that there is
a prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries in the foreign direct investment arena
that triggers harmful international tax competition among developing countries. The recent
Indian Supreme Court decision in re Union of India is used as a case-study.
Part IV explores the strategic interaction between developed and developing countries in
the area of international taxation (the second strategic interaction). It argues that a
representative developing country has the incentive to conclude OECD-based tax treaties
with developed countries for two different, but compatible reasons. First, the prisoner’s
dilemma among developing countries referred to above induces developing countries to
follow the OECD model for fear of driving FDI away to competing jurisdictions if all other
conditions are equal.
Second, the OECD model induces the emergence of a network market of international tax
systems that has the standard features of all network markets. For example, the OECDbased network market of international tax systems conveys positive network externalities
only to those countries (including developing countries) that are members of the OECDbased tax treaty network. Instances of positive network externalities emerging from the
OECD-based tax treaty network are the following two: first, the minimization of
communication and enforcement costs of the relevant tax treaty network; second,
reputational advantages over otherwise comparable rivals who do not belong to the tax
treaty network.14
Part V extends the theory on the emergence of the asymmetric tax treaty network to the
area of tax treaty interpretation in the developing world. Part V elaborates two points. First,
it argues that central provisions of the OECD model are predominantly standards-based
(rather than rules-based). Hence, the precise meaning of those provisions is not certain exante. Their precise meaning can only be determined ex-post through case law (or something
functionally equivalent to case law). Second, given the standard nature of the OECD model,
courts normally have enough room to strategically choose between competing (sometimes
opposing) constructions equally consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of
13
14

See Sections IV and V.
See Section IV.
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Treaties. Part V assumes that developing countries´ courts – consistent with the individual
interest of their own countries - are influenced by the prisoner’s dilemma and network
externalities arguments referred to above.15 Consequently, developing countries’ courts
have the incentive to construe the local tax treaty network in the foreign direct investment
arena in favour of the taxpayer (rather than the tax authority). Once again, the recent Indian
Supreme Court decision in re Union of India is used as a case-study. Part VI concludes.
II- Some Conceptual Issues
The world has experienced two globalization booms and one bust over the past two
centuries. The first boom started about 1820, and lasted until the advent of World War I.
The second began at the end of World War II and has continued since. The inter-war years
witnessed a retreat from this otherwise continuous shift towards greater global integration.

16

One major consequence of the globalization movement was the emergence in the late 19th
century of a novel strategic problem among nations: how to divide the international tax
base in the absence of a higher authority. Developed countries eventually reached a
fundamental consensus on how to solve this problem.17 That consensus is currently
embodied in the OECD model which is the foundation of a network of over 2500 bilateral
tax treaties that are either symmetric or asymmetric.18
The asymmetric tax treaty network represents a substantial part of the entire tax treaty
network. The United States and United Kingdom’s asymmetric tax treaty networks are
assumed to be representative examples. As of January 2006, the US tax treaty network
comprises sixty-three tax treaties, of which thirty-four are asymmetric.19 Thus, the US
asymmetric tax treaty network represents about 53% of its whole tax treaty network. The
United Kingdom tax treaty network comprises one hundred and thirteen tax treaties, of
which eighty three tax treaties are asymmetric. Hence, the UK asymmetric tax treaty
15

See Section III.
Jeffrey G. Williamson, Winners and Losers over Two Centuries of Globalization (NBER Working Paper
N° 9161, 1992), at http://post.econom-ics.harvard.edu/faculty/jwilliam/papers/w9161.pdf (last visited
December 14, 2003).
17
This consensus was suggested in the seminal Report on Double Taxation, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S. 73
F. 19 (1923).
18
On the definitions of symmetric and asymmetric tax treaties see Section I.
19
The standard that should be used to determine if a country is developed or developing is a controversial
question. This Article assumes that all OECD members are developed countries whereas all non-OECD
members are assumed to be developing countries. The US asymmetric tax treaties are those concluded with
the following 34 developing countries because investment flows between contracting states are assumed to be
unequal: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Belarus, Bermuda, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, India,
Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Morocco, Pakistan,
Philippines, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and Venezuela. Conversely, the United States symmetric tax treaties are
those concluded with the following 29 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg,
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (See the IBFD Tax Treaty data base at
http://online2.ibfd.org/cl/).
16
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network represents about 73% of its whole tax treaty network.20 These data can be showed
in graphic format as follows.

US TAX TREATY NETW ORK

47%
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The UK asymmetric tax treaties are those concluded with the following 83 developing countries and
associated territories (such as the Falklands Islands) because, as noted before, investment flows between
contracting states are assumed to be unequal: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei, Bulgaria, Chile,
China, Croatia, Cyprus, Dominica, Egypt, Falklands Islands, Fiji, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada,
Guernsey, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Isle of Man, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jersey, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta,
Mauritius, Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New
Guinea, Philippines, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands,
South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Christopher and Nevis, Sudan, Swaziland, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Trinidad
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia,
Zimbabwe. Conversely, the UK symmetric tax treaties are assumed to be the following 30: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia,
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States (See the IBFD Tax Treaty data
base at http://online2.ibfd.org/cl/.)
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Conventional wisdom maintains that the emergence of the international tax regime is a
miracle.21 This is so, the argument goes, because taxes are the last topic on which a
Hobbesian observer would have predicted sovereign nations to reach a consensus given the
zero-sum nature of the game: one’s country gain in revenue is another’s loss. This Article
argues, however, that the emergence of a core part of the international tax regime (i.e., the
asymmetric tax treaty network) is not a miracle, but rather an intelligible, sometimes failed,
attempt to solve the problems arising from the strategic interaction among nations for the
division of the international tax base.
Demonstrating that the emergence of the asymmetric tax treaty network is not a miracle
requires the discussion of some conceptual issues of game theory.22 Game theory is
particularly well suited to international tax relations because the lack of higher authority
places nations in a situation of pure strategic interaction, where they are solely concerned
with the limits that the behaviour of others places on their own pursuit of self-interest.23
21

Reuven Avi Yonah seems to have been the first author to coin the idea that the international tax regime is a
miracle. He maintains that “the current international tax regime is a flawed miracle”. See Reuven S. Avi
Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 Texas Law Review 1301,
1303. In a similar vein, Yariv Brauner refers to the “miraculous equilibrium achieved almost, solely, thanks to
tax treaties” (See Yariv Brauner, note 4, at 43 of the digital version of his paper).
22
Game theory is the formal analysis of interaction where the gains and losses of participants partly depend
on what others do. It assumes that everyone is instrumentally rational, that is, it assumes that every participant
will pursue his subjective ends by choosing the course of action that, given his belief, is both conductive to
that end and is personally the least costly. For an introduction to game theory, see Douglas Baird, Robert
Gertner & Randal Picker, Game Theory and the Law (1994).
23
Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, in Cooperation under Anarchy, 28 (1986). He
argues that “the purpose of any theory –including game theory- is not to reproduce reality but to increase our
understanding of fundamental processes by simplifying it. For this reason, it is not desirable to incorporate all
of the details of any individual case. Simplicity and abstraction guide us through a morass of information to
focus on more fundamental issues”. For a sceptical view on the explanatory potential of game theory and
international relations, see Fernando Tesón, A Philosophy of international law, Chapter 3 (1998) (arguing that
game theory is unable to explain moral decisions made by States.) The literature of international taxation and
game theory produced by international lawyers is small. Seminal papers in this area are the following: Charles
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1- Two Basic Types of Competition
This section refers two different sorts of competition that illuminate the strategic interaction
among developing countries in international taxation: competition between incompatible
standards and competition within a compatible standard.24 Both types of competition are
outlined below.
a- Competition between Incompatible Standards
One central feature of competition between incompatible standards is the lack of
cooperation between competitors. A familiar example of competition between incompatible
standards is the Philips and Sony battle in the videocassette recorder industry over
VHS/Betamax standards. Their lack of cooperation in the design of a compatible standard
meant that users of Betamax were unable to use VHS tapes in their machines (and viceversa). The competition between incompatible standards eventually led to the victory of
VHS and the defeat of its rival Betamax.25 In order to avoid repeating the VHS/Betamax
battle, Philips and Sony agreed to compete within a compatible standard in the compact
disk industry.
b- Competition within a Compatible Standard
Philips and Sony agreed on a compact disk standard and licensed their technology to
competitors. This triggered the emergence of competition within a compatible standard in
the compact disc industry. Agreeing on a compatible standard may eliminate competition
between technologies, but it does not eliminate competition altogether. Instead, it channels
competition into other dimensions, such as price, service, and product features.26
Competition within a compatible standard can be modelled as a co-opetition game.27 That
is, a game in which elements of cooperation and competition are mixed simultaneously. For
example, both Philips and Sony cooperated in the design of a compatible standard (e.g., the
CD format), and they competed in the CD market in areas such as price, service, and
product features.28
Kingston, The Coherence of International Taxation, 81 Columbia Law Review 1151 (1981) (arguing that tax
systems do interact and the implications of this; he maintains that the main players of the international tax
game are countries and that countries compete for revenues, investments, markets, and jobs); Tsilly Dagan,
National Interests in the International Tax Game, 18 Virginia Tax Review 363 (1998) (arguing that countries
play as self-interested players in the international tax game; footnote 40 of Dagan’s paper maintains that the
international tax game is a repeated game played infinitely).
24
See Standley M. Besen & Joseph Farell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in
Standardization, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 8, Number 2, Spring 1994, pages 117-131. The
relevance of distinguishing between these two different types of competition in international taxation is
outlined in Section II.2 below.
25
Ibidem, at 118 (describing the Betamax/VHS competition).
26
Ibidem.
27
Adam M. Brandenburger & Barry J. Nalebuff, Co-opetition, Currency Doubleday (1996).
28
See Standley M. Besen & Joseph Farell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in
Standardization, op. cit.
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In sum, given certain conditions, a co-opetition game emerges. That is, self-interested
players cooperate to create a bigger market, but compete to divide it up. Hence, there are
simultaneous elements of cooperation and competition at work among those players.29
One key consequence of competition within a compatible standard is the creation of a
network market, i.e., an environment where users can interact at a relatively low transaction
cost. For example, since the CD format is universally accepted by all CD producers, users
are able to interact at a lower transaction cost than would be the case if CD producers were
competing among incompatible standards.
Network markets normally have three main features: i) network externalities; ii)
expectation and iii) lock-in effect. Network externalities denote that the larger the number
of members of the network, the better for each of them. The classic example of network
externalities is the telephone. Indeed, the relative value of having a telephone is related to
the number of telephones being used.30
Expectation is another feature in any network market. In effect, one standard may prevail
over another not because it is better but because it is sponsored by an influential player. For
example, the initial success of MS-DOS is usually attributed not to any technical
superiority but to its support by IBM.31
A lock-in effect is frequent in any network market because better products that arrive later
may be unable to displace a technologically inferior one that arrived earlier. An example of
the lock-in effect is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard.32
2- The International Tax System as a Network Market
The analysis of this Article is premised on the following three major assumptions. First,
developing countries are habitually engaged in international tax competition within a
compatible standard (rather than between incompatible standards). The current compatible
standard is the OECD model, which channels international tax competition into areas that
are not regulated by the OECD Model, such as the inclusion of clauses like most–favourednation in asymmetric tax treaties.33 Second, the OECD-based tax treaty network is a
network market of decentralized international tax regimes that has the standard features of
all network markets: externalities, expectations, and lock-in effects.34 Third, the OECD
model compatible standard is capable of destroying incompatible standards (such as the

29

Ibidem.
Ibidem.
31
Ibidem.
32
Standley M. Besen & Joseph Farell, supra note _ (describing the QWERTY case as an example of lock-in
effect in network markets.)
33
See Section IV.1.a (offering examples of asymmetric tax treaties that include most-favoured-nation clauses
(MFN). The OECD model does not even refer to the MFN clause).
34
See Section IV.1.b (providing examples of externalities, expectations and lock-in effects of the OECDbased tax treaty network).
30
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Andean Model)35 and inducing other, different, but compatible standards (such as the
United Nations model) to gradually converge towards the OECD Model.36
III- The Strategic Interaction among Developing Countries
There are several macroeconomic differences between developed and developing
countries.37 One main difference is that developing countries have not yet reached a
sufficient level of national income to yield the domestic savings necessary to finance the
investment required for further growth.38 Thus, developing countries normally have a
relatively compelling need for inward investment vis-à–vis developed countries to finance,
for example, public goods. This need has triggered international tax competition among
developing countries to attract inward investment that has been apparent since at least the
end of World War II.39 International tax competition was facilitated by the increasing
mobility of capital, which was in turn accelerated by such technological advances as the
electronic transfer of funds and improved long-distance communication.40
This section focuses on the strategic interaction among developing countries in
international taxation. It argues that there is a prisoner’s dilemma among developing
countries in the area of foreign direct investment that induces developing countries to incur
in harmful international tax competition. To illustrate, I shall focus on the Supreme Court
of India decision in re Union of India. This Article assumes that Union of India is a
representative case of international tax competition among developing countries.
1- China versus India: The Union of India Case
The case of Union of India and Anr vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan and Anr (the Union of India
case) was decided by the Supreme of Court of India on 7 October 2003. The facts of the
case, the main issue, and the holding of the Indian Supreme Court are as follows.
Foreign investors, both institutional and direct, many of them from OECD countries, had
been massively channelling their investment into India via Mauritius (rather than
channelling them from OECD countries directly into India). Those investors had decided to
utilize the Indo-Mauritius tax treaty because of its advantageous tax features (tax treaty
shopping).
35

See Section III.3.a (focusing on the incompatibility of the OECD and Andean Models and the virtual
irrelevance of the Andean model in international taxation).
36
See Section III.3.b (offering an explanation of why the evolution of the UN model is towards an increasing
convergence with the OECD model.)
37
According to the World Bank, as of 2003, there are 208 countries in the world. While 56 are developed
countries, the remaining 152 are developing countries. That is, over 73% of all countries are developing ones.
See
World
Investment
Report
(2003)
available
at
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=2412&lang=1.
38
See Dictionary of Economics, Graham Bannock, R.E. Baxer, Evans Davis, Penguin, Sixth Edition, at 104
(1998).
39
See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Globalisation, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State 113
Harvard Law Review 1573 at 1575 (2000).
40
Ibidem.
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The scheme was structured via a conduit company based in Mauritius to channel
investment from, say, the Netherlands to India in such a way as to subject capital gains to
double non-taxation. For example, the alienation of shares of companies based in India
controlled from a conduit company based in Mauritius was not subject to capital gains in
either India or Mauritius under the Indo-Mauritius tax treaty. Moreover, that flow of
income was not taxed by Netherlands domestic law. 41
The use of this sort of tax treaty shopping scheme had resulted in an increase of funds
coming into India from 37.5 million Rupees in 1993 to 61.7 billion Rupees in the year
2001.42 It was basically produced by the interaction of the Indo-Mauritius Tax Treaty and
Mauritius domestic tax law, according to which conduit companies based in Mauritius are
exempted from both India and Mauritius taxes on the capital gains made on the sale of
shares of Indian companies.
The main issue before the Indian Supreme Court was whether the tax treaty shopping was
valid under the Indo-Mauritius tax treaty, considering that the only justification for
channelling the investment in that way was tax avoidance. The Indian Supreme Court
described the term “tax treaty shopping” as “a graphic expression used to describe the act
of a resident of a third country taking advantage of a fiscal treaty between two contracting
states.”43
The Indian Supreme Court decided the case in favour of the taxpayer. It argued that the tax
treaty shopping at issue in this case was lawful and reversed the lower court decision. The
Supreme Court elaborated two independent arguments for backing its decision. These two
arguments are based on law and economics, and legal considerations, respectively. The
Indian Supreme Court elaborated its law-and-economics analysis as follows. It focused on
the cost/benefit implications of tax treaty shopping as a vehicle for attracting FDI to India.
“Developing countries need foreign investments, and the treaty
shopping opportunities can be an additional factor to attract them. The
use of Cyprus as a treaty haven has helped capital inflows into Eastern
Europe. Madeira (Portugal) is attractive for investments into the
European Union. Singapore is developing itself as a base for
investments in South East Asia and China. Mauritius today provides a
suitable treaty conduit for South Asia and South Africa. In recent years,
India has been the beneficiary of significant funds through the
‘Mauritius conduit’. Although the Indian economic reforms since 1991

41

Channelling an investment by a Dutch Corporation in India through a conduit company in Mauritius (Mcorp) by equity contributions to the M-corp, which acquires the company in India, is relatively simple in the
case that the Dutch participation exemption applies to the shareholding in M-corp. In that case, dividends
from and capital gains on the shares in the M-corp might be exempted from tax in the Netherlands. I am
grateful to Professor Heiko Lohuis from the University of Leiden for this example.
42
Union
of
India
case,
paragraph
127.
<http://www.lexsite.com/home.asp?destination=lexdoc.asp?DocId=213107>. See also Jayanthi Iyengar,
Mauritius Tax Loophole Under Indian Scrutiny, Asia Times, December 5, 2002
http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/corrupt/2002/1205mauritius.htm
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permitted such capital transfers, the amount would have been much
lower without the India-Mauritius tax treaty.”44
“The developing countries allow treaty shopping to encourage capital
and technology inflows, which developed countries are keen to provide
to them. The loss of revenue could be insignificant compared to the
other non-tax benefits to their economy.”45
Treaty shopping “is perhaps regarded in contemporary thinking as a
necessary evil in a developing country.”46

The Indian Supreme Court then elaborated a legal (rather than a cost/benefit) argument for
backing the treaty shopping focused on in this case. It compared the wording of the IndoUS and the Indo-Mauritius tax treaties in the areas of anti-avoidance methods, concluding
that treaty shopping is invalid under the former and valid under the latter. The Court said:
“Article 24 of the Indo-US tax treaty is in marked contrast with the
Indo-Mauritius tax treaty. The appellants rightly contend that in the
absence of a limitation clause, such as the one contained in Article 24
of the Indo-U.S. Treaty, there are no disabling or disentitling
conditions under the Indo-Mauritius Treaty prohibiting the resident of
a third nation from deriving benefits thereunder.”47 Hence, treaty
shopping “…may have been intended at the time when the IndoMauritius tax treaty was entered into.”48

Finally, the Court construed domestic anti-avoidance provisions, such as the business
purpose test, in such a restrictive way as to severely limit their scope in the tax treaty area.
The Court argued as follows:
“…[T]he taxpayer, where he is in a position to carry through a
transaction in two alternative ways, one of which will result in
liability to tax and the other of which will not, is at liberty to choose
the latter and to do so effectively in the absence of any specific tax
avoidance provision.”49

The Supreme Court of India did not refer to the commentary to Article 1 of the OECD
model, which implicitly bars tax treaty shopping. This omission could be justified on two
alternative grounds. First, the Supreme Court of India implicitly decided that the OECD
model Commentary is not binding on India in light of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.50 Second, the Supreme Court of India implicitly followed a static (rather than
an ambulatory) interpretation of the Indo-Mauritius tax treaty. Hence, the OECD
44
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See Philip Baker, Double Taxation Conventions. A Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on
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commentary on tax treaty shopping is irrelevant in this case given that it was published
after (rather than before) the 1983 conclusion of the Indo-Mauritius tax treaty.
In short, the holding of the Supreme Court of India in re Union of India is as follows. Tax
treaty shopping is valid under the Indian tax treaty network, unless there is a specific tax
treaty prohibition, such as a Limitation of Benefit Clause. Moreover, general, domestic
anti-avoidance provisions (e.g., the business purpose test) cannot be applied to address tax
treaty shopping cases.
The holding of the Supreme Court of India arguably creates a (controversial) taxpayer right.
Indeed, it grants taxpayers the right to implement tax treaty shopping schemes that produce
double non-taxation outcomes.
As noted earlier, this Article assumes that Union of India is a representative case of
international tax competition among developing countries. It can be modelled as a
prisoner’s dilemma as follows.
India
Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

2,2

4,1

Defect

1,4

3,3

China

Prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries in the FDI area
In the matrix above, both players are developing countries: India and China. Both countries
had concluded bilateral tax treaties with Mauritius, and it is assumed that China is as good
as India at attracting FDI.51 They are competing with each other to attract FDI, let us also
assume, major foreign investments from OECD countries such as the Netherlands (foreign
investor). India and China may choose between two alternative strategies: to cooperate with
the other player by not engaging in harmful tax competition and considering tax treaty
shopping invalid (cooperate), or to engage in harmful tax competition by considering tax
treaty shopping lawful (defect). Let us also assume that there are no other actors that can
influence the decisions of these two players. Each country has only to consider the
51

Both China and India have concluded bilateral tax treaties with Mauritius. For example, the Income Tax
Agreement and Final Protocol concluded by China (P.R.C.) and Mauritius was entered into on August 1,
1994. It is available in LEXIS, World Tax Treaties.
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behaviour of the other country. The matrix above shows a possible structure of payoffs in
such a situation.52
This strategic interaction of India and countries such as China arguably explains why the
Indian Supreme Court had the incentive to hold that tax treaty shopping is lawful.53 The
following Indian Supreme Court words dramatically reflected its awareness of the
prisoner’s dilemma in which India was involved: “[Treaty shopping] is a necessary evil in a
developing economy.”54
In sum, the Union of India case suggests that developing countries normally have the
incentive to offer mutually harmful tax incentives to potential foreign direct investors
because developing countries do not have better options for attracting them given the
prisoner’s dilemma in which they are involved. Hence, developing countries tend to offer a
variety of tax incentives even in those cases in which the foregone tax revenue exceeds the
increase in the desired foreign direct investment.55
The harmful international tax competition referred to above has led a number of developing
countries to gradually mutate into some type of production tax haven (103 as of 1998).56
This scenario arguably explains the gradual decline of tax revenues from corporate income
taxation in the developing world. From 1990 to 2001, corporate tax rates declined in both
developed and developing countries. However, in developed countries that decline in the
rates was matched by a broadening of the tax base, so that no decline in revenues can be
observed; in developing countries, the same period witnessed a decline of corporate tax
52

The symbols in this matrix are as follows. One player, India, is represented in the column; the other player,
China, is represented in the row. As said, both players can choose to cooperate or not to cooperate. This
generates four possible combinations for those two individual choices. The numbers stand for the payoff for
each combination, ordinarily ranked (Thus, for each player 1>2>3>4). In this matrix, India’s best outcome (1)
is to offer a tax incentive to the foreign investor when China does not do so (i.e. 4,1). Hence, the foreign
investor will prefer India over China for locating its investment provided all other things are equal between
both countries. India’s worst outcome (4) is the reverse, that is, to cooperate unilaterally, and thus become
vulnerable to China’s tax incentive (i.e. 1,4). India’s second best outcome (2) occurs if both cooperate by not
incurring in harmful tax competition (i.e. 2,2). Thus, the chosen country would be able to tax this business
activity, and hence raise revenue to finance the public goods desired by its constituents. India’s third best
outcome (3) is to incur in harmful tax competition (i.e. 3,3). This is worse than avoiding harmful tax
competition (because it forces India to collect less than optimum tax revenues), but better than cooperating
unilaterally. The same analysis holds for China: to take advantage of the other’s party naïveté is the best
outcome (cooperate when the other party does not); mutual cooperation is the second best outcome (to
mutually avoid harmful tax competition); mutual defection is the third best outcome (to mutually incur in
harmful tax competition); and unrequired cooperation (limiting harmful tax competition unilaterally) is the
worst outcome.
The dominant strategy for each country caught in this dilemma is not to cooperate, that is to incur in harmful
tax competition. Because both countries reason in a similar way, both will incur in harmful tax competition,
thus reaching the lower left cell (3,3) in the matrix above, which is not a socially optimum point (2,2).
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revenues by about 20% on average.57 That decline is particularly important in light of the
larger overall share of tax revenues produced by the corporate tax in developing countries
(average of 17 percent, as opposed to 7 percent for developed countries). Most of the
decline has been attributed to the spread of targeted tax incentives for multinational
enterprises (MNEs). From 1990 to 2001, the percentage of developing countries granting
tax holidays to MNEs grew from 45% to 58%, and similar trends can be seen in tax breaks
for exporters (32% to 45%), reduced corporate rates for MNEs (40% to 60%), and free
trade zones (17.5% to 45%).58
The mutation of many developing countries into production tax havens sometimes is the
first step towards achieving development. For example, Ireland originally mutated into a
production tax haven in the software service area. As the Irish workforce and certain
institutional elements improved over time, other high-value service areas emerged. Ireland
eventually became a developed country within a few decades.59
2- Is the Arm’s Length Standard Dormant in Developing Countries?
The prisoner’s dilemma referred to above produces two major consequences. First, as seen,
it explains the frequent mutation of developing countries into production tax havens.
Second, it implies a growing gap between the law on the books and law in action in the area
of international taxation in the developing world. This growing gap will be explored in this
section using the arm’s length standard as a case study.
Many developing countries have included in their tax legislation some of the measures
requested by the OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition, such as transfer pricing
regulations based on the OECD Guidelines.60 However, a representative developing
country does not have the incentive to actually enforce transfer pricing regulations for fear
of driving FDI away to other jurisdictions. As the United Nations has argued, “many
developing countries are in a delicate position if they want to curb transfer pricing abuses
without adversely affecting foreign investment flows”.61
57

Michael Keen and Alejandro Simone, Is Tax Competition Harming Developing Countries More than
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This strategic scenario explains, for instance, the virtual absence of transfer pricing
litigation in the developing world.62 Hence, this Article assumes that the arm’s length
standard is normally dormant in the developing world, except in exceptional circumstances
like the following three: a) countries that face difficulties in raising funds from the
international capital market because, say, they have defaulted on sovereign debt; b) large
developing countries in which inward investment is not deterred by transfer pricing
enforcement because of the relatively large size of their domestic market; c) industries that
cannot readily move their businesses elsewhere and are under-represented in the local
political process.
In the first group, the sovereign debt default has substantially limited a country’s ability to
raise funds from the international capital market. This paper assumes that that inability to
use the capital market has induced countries like Argentina to be aggressive in the
enforcement of its international tax law in order to maximize tax revenue collection. This
aggressive enforcement has produced inter alia, a wave of transfer pricing litigation in
Argentina since 2003. Not coincidentally, 2003 was the year after it defaulted on its
sovereign debt.63
In the second group, transfer pricing litigation occurs in jurisdictions such as Brazil and
Mexico. These are markets large enough to be aggressive in the enforcement of transfer
pricing regulations with limited fear of driving FDI to other jurisdictions. For example, tax
assessments in Brazil related to transfer pricing adjustments have become a frequent
occurrence and involve larger sums of money. While tax assessments unrelated to transfer
pricing issues have an average assessed amount of BRL 2.7 million (approximately US
$1.15 million), transfer pricing tax assessments have an average assessed amount of almost
7.5 times higher, totalling on average BRL 20.2 million (approximately US $8.6 million).64

done by using language similar to that found in tax treaties. Such an approach
ensures that there is a basis in domestic law for making transfer pricing
adjustments. In many countries, it is not clear whether tax treaties on their
own would provide a sufficient basis for such adjustments, and, in any event,
it is necessary to have the rules in the case of residents of countries with
which there is no tax treaty in force. Using statutory language based on
treaties has the added advantage of giving a clear signal that the country
intends to follow international norms”, Richard Vann, International Aspects
of Income Tax, at 782, published at Tax Law Design and Drafting, Victor
Thuronyi editor, Volume 2, International Monetary Fund, 1998.
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See David Roberto R. Soares da Silva, Brazil Tightens Transfer Pricing Regime, Tax Notes Int'l, June 5,
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April 3, 2001 (Discussing the Brazilian federal court injunction according to which the Brazil-German tax
treaty prevails over Brazil’s domestic transfer pricing norms that are inconsistent with the arm’s length
standard).
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In the third group, transfer pricing litigation is focused on industries that cannot readily
move to other jurisdictions and are under-represented in the local political process. This
paper assumes that the Argentine industry of agricultural commodities (such as soya) is a
case in point. Indeed, it is governed by a relatively stringent transfer pricing regulation that
has already triggered transfer pricing litigation in this area.65 This type of agricultural
commodity industry cannot readily move to other jurisdictions and is not labour intensive,
which normally implies an under-representation in the local political process.
3- Why the international tax regime has failed to solve the PD among Developing
Countries
As said, the strategic interaction among developing countries in the area of foreign direct
investment is a prisoner’s dilemma, which triggers mutually harmful tax competition
among developing countries. It is time to question why the international tax regime has
been unable to solve such a prisoner’s dilemma.
There are two central mechanisms for solving a prisoner’s dilemma.66 On the one hand, it
may be solved through a contract entered into by the parties and enforced by an external
authority capable of conveying a credible threat to the defecting party (the contract
solution).67
On the other hand, a prisoner’s dilemma may be solved via iteration, that is, being played
repeatedly (iterated prisoner’s dilemma). The iterated prisoner’s dilemma may lead players
to develop cooperative behaviour under the tit-for-tat rule, which means that players tend to
start the game with cooperative behaviour, defecting only if the other player has defected
on the previous move (the tit-for-tat solution).68
A classic example of the tit-for-tat rule is the live-and-let-live system in trench warfare
during World War I. German and British soldiers deployed in trench warfare were able to
spontaneously reach cooperation among themselves according to which no British soldier
would shoot to kill a German one unless the other had done it first (and vice-versa).69
Tit-for-tat emerges if certain conditions are met. These conditions are the following: a) the
relationship among the players shall be perceived as durable; b) cooperation shall be based
on reciprocity; and c) the players shall have the ability to recognize defection when it
occurs.70 That is, there shall be clarity of behaviour so that the other player can adapt to the
first player’s pattern of action (i.e., the player must have the ability to retaliate for the other
65
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party’s uncooperative move).71 The basic idea is that a player must not be able to get away
with defecting without the other individual being able to retaliate effectively. It is important
for one player to know what the other player actually did on the previous move because titfor-tat always defects exactly once after each defection by the other.72 If these requirements
are met, the prisoner’s dilemma may be solved spontaneously without legal intervention.
Let us explore both mechanisms for solving a prisoner’s dilemma using international
taxation as a case study. The contract and tit-for-tat solutions will be studied independently
as follows.
This Article assumes that in the area of inward investment, the states of the United States of
America face a strategic interaction among themselves that is similar to that faced by
developing countries. Both groups of tax jurisdictions have the incentive to engage in
mutually harmful tax competition (such as the offering of location tax incentives) for
promoting inward investment. This is because both groups of tax jurisdictions are involved
in a prisoner’s dilemma.73
Interestingly, the Constitution of the United States of America includes a legal device that
tries to solve the prisoner’s dilemma in which the US states are involved. It is implemented
through a provision that is functionally equivalent to a contract (the Commerce Clause) and
that is enforced by an external authority (the federal judiciary).
The Commerce Clause limits certain types of harmful tax competition among the states.74
For example, the Commerce Clause prohibits states from giving tax incentives to
businesses to locate in-state in the same way that it constrains states from providing other
measures designed to set a state’s economy apart from the nation’s.75 Moreover, the US
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Constitution grants the federal judiciary the role of an external authority with the power to
sanction defecting states.
The role of the Commerce Clause and the federal judiciary outlined in the previous
paragraph is consistent with the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in re Cuno.76 (The Court of Appeals decision was eventually reversed by the United
States Supreme Court on procedural, rather than substantive, grounds. Hence, the Supreme
Court may share the Court of Appeals holding on the merits in a future case.77)
This Article assumes that the Cuno case is a representative example of harmful tax
competition among the US states through location incentives. In 1998, Daimler Chrysler
entered into an agreement with the City of Toledo to construct a new vehicle-assembly
plant near the company's existing facility in exchange for various tax incentives. Daimler
Chrysler estimated that it would invest approximately $ 1.2 billion in this project, which
would provide the region with several thousand new jobs. In return, the City and two local
school districts agreed to give Daimler Chrysler a ten-year, 100 percent property tax
exemption, as well as an investment tax credit of 13.5 percent against the state corporate
franchise tax for certain qualifying investments. The total value of the tax incentives was
estimated to be worth $ 280 million.78
Ohio's investment tax credit grants a taxpayer a non-refundable credit against the state's
corporate franchise tax if the taxpayer "purchases new manufacturing machinery and
equipment during the qualifying period, provided that the new manufacturing machinery
and equipment are installed in [Ohio]."79 The investment tax credit is generally 7.5 percent
"of the excess of the cost of the new manufacturing machinery and equipment purchased
during the calendar year for use in a county over the county average new manufacturing
machinery and equipment investment for that county."80 The rate increases to 13.5 percent
of the cost of the new investment if it is purchased for use in specific economically
depressed areas.81 The credit may not exceed $ 1 million unless the taxpayer has increased
its overall ownership of manufacturing equipment in the state during the year for which the
credit is claimed.82 To the extent that the credit exceeds the corporation's total Ohio
franchise tax liability in a particular year, the balance of the credit is carried forward and
can be used to reduce its liability in any of the three following years.83
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the Ohio investment tax
credit was inconsistent with the Commerce Clause provided by the US Constitution. This
decision was grounded on the rationale that an investment credit is a location incentive that
is an invalid state regulation of interstate commerce. 84
The Court of Appeals decision in re Cuno successfully solves the said prisoner’s dilemma
via a contract entered into by the States (i.e., the Commerce Clause) enforced by an
external authority (i.e., the United States federal judiciary). Consequently, the US
constitutional framework can solve the prisoner’s dilemma in which the US states are
involved in the inward investment area. The European Union has implemented a legal
framework similar to the United States Commerce Clause. It has been applied by the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in a number of cases for solving the prisoner’s dilemma
emerging from the location tax incentives area.85
The United States legal framework has not been replicated in the international tax regime
arena. There is an OECD Report that is functionally equivalent to the Commerce Clause,
but unfortunately, there is no institution equivalent to an external authority capable of
conveying a credible threat for defecting jurisdictions, such as the United States federal
judiciary.
The OECD 1998 Report entitled Harmful Tax Competition: an Emerging Global Issue
(OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition) is functionally equivalent to the US
Commerce Clause in the following respect. Both the Commerce Clause and the OECD
Report on Harmful Tax Competition prohibit tax jurisdictions from establishing targeted
location tax incentives for foreigners in order to promote inward investment. For example,
the targeted tax incentives focused on the Cuno case are arguably prohibited by both the
Commerce Clause and the OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition. 86 However, the
84
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OECD is not functionally equivalent to the United States Federal Judiciary. It lacks the
power to convey a centralised, credible threat to uncooperative jurisdictions.
In sum, developing countries have been unable to enter into a treaty capable of solving their
prisoner’s dilemma due to the lack of an external authority.87 Hence, the first method of
solving a prisoner’s dilemma referred to above (i.e., by a contract) does not work in the
international tax scenario.
The relevant question at this point is the following: Why does an iterated prisoner’s
dilemma not emerge among developing countries to spontaneously solve the harmful
international tax competition in which they are involved? In order to answer this question,
it is necessary to recall the elements required for “tit-for-tat” to emerge, and then to
determine which of those elements are not met in the developing countries´ context.
As discussed above, “tit-for-tat” emerges if certain conditions are met, namely that: a) the
relationship between the players is perceived as durable; b) the cooperation is based on
reciprocity; and c) the players have the ability to recognize defection when it occurs.88
Clarity of behaviour must exist so that the players can adapt to the other player’s pattern of
action; in other words, players must have the ability to retaliate in response to
uncooperative moves made by the other players.89 The basic idea is that a player must not
be able to get away with defecting without the other player being able to retaliate
effectively. It is important for one player to know what the other player actually did on the
previous move because tit-for-tat always defects exactly once after each defection by the
other.90 If these requirements are met, the prisoner’s dilemma may be solved via iteration
without external intervention.
First, this paper assumes that developing countries´ political instability normally implies a
frequent turnover of both governments and public officials (including those involved in tax
matters). This turnover makes it difficult for reciprocity among countries to arise because,
according to empirical tests done by Axelrod, tit-for-tat normally emerges if the identity of
the players is relatively stable. Hence, requirement “a” listed above is not normally met by
developing countries.
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Second, this paper assumes that developing countries normally face high monitoring costs
for identifying any defecting behaviour by their developing country counterparts. In effect,
it is usually costly for a representative developing country to promptly identify the harmful
tax incentives that another developing country may have introduced to its tax system. This
is so for a number of reasons that include the following two. On the one hand, developing
countries´ institutions (e.g., tax authorities) are not usually sophisticated enough to produce
this key information in a timely manner. On the other hand, as already been argued, there
normally is a substantial gap between the law on the books and law in action in the
developing world. For example, there may be transfer pricing norms in a given developing
country but they might have been implicitly abrogated by lack of enforcement.91 Hence, the
requirements “b” and “c” according to which the players must have reciprocity and the
ability to recognize defection when it occurs are not normally met by developing countries
in the international tax area.
In sum, it is difficult for “tit-for-tat” to emerge among developing countries in the area of
international taxation. This prevents the prisoner’s dilemma from being spontaneously
solved.
Let us now explore two relevant attempts to accommodate the interests of developing
countries in the international tax arena: the Andean and UN model tax conventions. The
next section’s central question is why those attempts have failed to solve the
aforementioned prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries.
a- The Andean Model Tax Convention
Five South American countries are Members of the Cartagena Agreement of 1969, which
established a sub-regional common market in Latin America.92 They signed a multilateral
tax agreement in 1971 along with a model tax convention, which should be used by
Member States when negotiating bilateral tax treaties with non-member countries (the
Andean Model Tax Convention (Andean MTC) or Andean model).
The Andean MTC was intended to protect the taxing jurisdiction of Member States
especially vis-à-vis developed countries. It is based on the source or territorial principle. It
gives exclusive taxing power to the source country.93 The profits are taxable only in the
state where the business activities are undertaken using a broad definition of permanent
establishment.94 Royalties are only taxable where the technology is used.95 Interest from
loans is taxable where the loan is used.96 Dividends are taxable where the company
distributing the dividends is resident. Only the country where the property is located at the
time of its disposal may tax capital gains. Personal services may only be taxed where the
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services are performed. There are also provisions for exchange of information and mutual
assistance on tax matters among the Contracting States
The Andean MTC has been in force for over 30 years. It has never been used as the basis
for a bilateral tax treaty among a developed and developing country arguably because no
developed country was willing to accept the exclusive taxing power of the source country.97
The Andean community tax treaty network is currently largely based on the OECD
Model.98 There are only two tax treaties concluded between developing countries which are
based on the Andean model.99 Thus, the Andean model is virtually irrelevant in
international taxation.
The Andean MTC can be seen as a failed attempt for two main reasons. First, the Andean
model aims to solve the prisoner’s dilemma in which developing countries are involved.
Both players are developing countries who are members of the Cartagena Agreement and
both have two alternative individual choices: to defect or to cooperate. These options can
be defined as follows. To defect means adopting residence based taxation (as provided for
by the OECD model) when concluding tax treaties with developed countries. To cooperate
means adopting source taxation (as provided for by the Andean model) when concluding
tax treaties with developed countries. Unsurprisingly, the defecting option prevailed within
the members of the Cartagena Agreement given: i) the lack of an external authority capable
of sanctioning defecting behaviour of the players, and ii) the lack of emergence of a tit-for
tat pattern of behaviour among the players.100
Second, the Andean model can also be seen as an attempt to change the nature of the
international tax competition among countries: from competition within a compatible
standard (the OECD model) into a competition between incompatible standards (the OECD
and Andean models). The OECD and Andean models are incompatible because while the
OECD model has a residence bias, the Andean Model has a source bias. 101 The Andean
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model was eventually defeated by the OECD model. The defeat of the Andean model by
the OECD model is functionally equivalent to the Betamax defeat by VHS in the
videocassette recorder technology. In both scenarios there was competition between
incompatible standards; and the prevailing standard implied the virtual elimination of the
rival one.102 In short, the Andean model failed to solve the prisoner’s dilemma among
developing countries in international taxation for the two major reasons stated in the
previous paragraph.
b- The UN Model Tax Convention
The United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention (UN model) is somewhere
between the (pro-source country) Andean model and the (pro-residence country) OECD
model. Indeed, the UN model attempts to provide larger, but not exclusive, jurisdiction to
tax to the source country than that granted by the OECD model.
The main goal of the UN model is to help developing countries (which are normally source
countries) in their tax treaty negotiations with developed countries by providing a model
tax treaty.103 The UN model emerged after both the OECD (1963) and Andean models
(1969). The UN model was first published in 1980 and eventually updated in 2001.
The UN consists of the OECD model with 27 specific adaptations aimed at enlarging
source taxation vis a vis residence taxation.104 These adaptations include the following: the
UN permanent establishment definition is broader than that of the OECD model;105 the UN
model provides a “limited force of attraction rule” that aims to deter the manipulation of
permanent establishment attribution rules;106 and the UN definition of royalty is broader
that that of the OECD model.107
The evolution of the UN model from its 1980 to 2001 version is towards an increasing
similarity with the OECD model.108 The dynamics of the converging trend towards the
OECD model compatible standard is assumed to be similar to that witnessed in United
States corporate law towards the Delaware compatible standard.109 This evolutionary trend
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is arguably triggered by the lock-in effect of the relevant leading compatible standard110
(that is, the OECD model in international taxation and the Delaware model in the United
States corporate law).
In sum, the international tax regime (be it in the OECD, UN or Andean Model versions) has
been unable so far to solve the prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries for two
core reasons: a) the lack of an external authority with the authority of conveying a credible
threat for defecting countries; b) the lack of an iterated prisoner’s dilemma among countries
able to spontaneously solve the said prisoner’s dilemma. 111
IV- The Strategic Interaction among Developed and Developing Countries
The motives for which developing countries enter into OECD-type tax treaties with
developed countries are debatable for two major reasons. First, the OECD model assumes a
number of elements that are normally absent in asymmetric tax treaties. Those assumptions
include a symmetric flow of cross-border income between tax treaty partners,112 and a
network of domestic courts capable of producing case law with public-good features.113
Second, there is no empirical evidence about on impact of OECD-based tax treaties on
Foreign Direct Investment in developing countries.114 These two reasons cause some
disagreement as to the extent that the OECD model is a cost-effective method for
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developing countries to attract FDI given the restriction of source taxation that OECDbased tax treaties imply.
This Section argues that a representative developing country has the incentive to conclude
OECD-based tax treaties with developed countries for two different (but compatible)
central reasons. First, there is a prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries in the FDI
arena that, ceteris paribus, induces developing countries to follow the OECD model for
fear of driving FDI to competing jurisdictions. Second, the OECD model produces a
network market of international tax systems that has the standard features of all network
markets.
1- Why the Asymmetric Tax Treaty Network Emerged
a- The Prisoner’s Dilemma Explanation
Since the end of the World War II, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become an
important international legal mechanism for the encouragement and governance of foreign
direct investment. These intergovernmental treaties normally grant extensive rights to
foreign investors, including protection of contractual rights, the right to international
arbitration in the event of an investment dispute, and the most-favoured-nation-clause. The
spread of asymmetric BITs is driven by international competition among potential host
countries –typically developing countries- for foreign direct investment.115
The evidence suggests that potential hosts are more likely to sign BITs when their
competitors have done so.116 The finding is that BITs’ diffusion is associated with
competitive economic pressures among developing countries to capture a share of foreign
investment.117 Hence, the emergence of asymmetric BITs is arguably triggered by a
prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries in the area of foreign direct investments.118
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This paper assumes that the same prisoner’s dilemma that explains the emergence of
asymmetric BITs also explains the emergence of the asymmetric tax treaty network. This
assumption is grounded on the following rationale. There are a number of differences
between the tax treaty and BITs networks. However, both types of asymmetric treaty
networks seek the same fundamental goal: to provide investors with credible property rights
protection according to norms that are normally consistent with customary international
law.119 Hence, both asymmetric treaty networks effectively imply an institutional
outsourcing in the property rights arena.
There are a number of examples that show the interaction between asymmetric BITs and
the asymmetric tax treaty networks. The gradual inclusion of standard BIT clauses (such as
the most–favoured nation) in the asymmetric tax treaty network is a case in point.120 For
example, the most favoured nation clause is included in several asymmetric tax treaties
concluded by Argentina with OECD member countries.121 As noted, the interaction
The authors design and test three different measures of economic competition. They also look for indirect
evidence of competitive pressure on the host to sign BITs. The evidence suggests that potential hosts are more
likely to sign BITs when their competitors have done so. They find some evidence that coercion plays a role,
but less support for learning or cultural explanations. Their main finding is that diffusion in this case is
associated with competitive economic pressures among developing countries to capture a share of foreign
investment. They are dubious of the benefits of this competition for development).
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in the ´Hull Rule,’ [that] held that ´no government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever
purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefore”). See also Reuven Avi
Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57 Tax Law Review 483, 496-498 (2004) (arguing that “an
international tax regime does exist and that it rises to the level of customary international law”).
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between both treaty networks is arguably triggered by international competition among
developing countries for inward investment.
The prisoner’s dilemma theoretical framework provides a strong explanation for developing
countries´ behaviour in international taxation. It sheds light on the controversy about the
emergence of the asymmetric tax treaty network that has been addressed by prominent
academics, such as Charles McLure, Tsilly Dagan, Yariv Brauner, and Diane Ring. Some
of their views on this controversy will be analysed in light of the prisoner’s dilemma
framework.
Charles McLure has argued that “[…] although developing countries may prefer to follow
the UN Model Treaty, which is generally more favourable to source countries, they often
lack the political clout to prevail in treaty negotiations with developed countries”.122
Charles McLure´s point seems to be consistent with the prisoner’s dilemma theoretical
framework. His point could be reconceptualised as follows. Ceteris paribus, the larger the
relative relevance of a given developing country in the global economy, the closer its tax
treaty network will be to the UN model. Conversely, the smaller the relative relevance of a
given developing country in the global economy, the closer its tax treaty network will be to
the OECD model. Hence, the UN and OECD models are the opposing ends of a continuum.
The tax treaty network of a given developing country will be closer to the UN or OECD
model depending on its relative relevance on the global economy.
The Brazilian and Kazakhstan asymmetric tax treaty networks are a case in point. Indeed,
the Brazilian asymmetric tax treaty network is closer to the UN model than to the OECD
model,123 whereas the Kazakhstan tax treaty network is closer to the OECD or US models
than to the UN model.124 This seems to be so because Brazil is relatively more significant
than Kazakhstan in the global economy.
Tsilly Dagan has argued that developing countries should avoid international double
taxation through unilateral mechanisms (rather than tax treaties) because the former is more
cost-effective than the latter for developing countries´ interests.125 Even assuming that her
point on this topic is correct on normative grounds, from a positive perspective the
unilateral mechanism is only available to a developing country at a relatively high cost. In
effect, as stated above, if a given developing country does not consent to sign a bilateral tax
treaty with a developed country, it is likely ceteris paribus that another developing country
122
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will. This pattern of behaviour is the result of the above mentioned prisoner’s dilemma
involving developing countries, and the network externalities derived from the tax treaty
network.126 Within that strategic framework, entering into a tax treaty seems to be the best
available option for a representative developing country to attract FDI into its jurisdiction if
all other conditions are equal.127 In sum, Tsylly Dagan´s point arguably overlooks
international tax competition among developing countries.
Yariv Brauner has maintained that “...there is a definite proof that developing countries
have benefited from the current bilateral tax treaty practice. They have never been forced,
nor claimed to have been forced, into concluding a bilateral tax treaty with a developed
country. In fact, in most cases the developing countries wish to conclude treaties with the
developed countries, which reject their wishes in times...”. 128
Brauner’s point also arguably overlooks international tax competition among developing
countries. The fact that developing countries normally conclude OECD-based tax treaties
may be the result of the prisoner’s dilemma referred to above. Indeed, developing countries
have no better option (from an individual rather than aggregate perspective) for attracting
FDI given the prisoner’s dilemma and network market in which they are involved.
Moreover, developed countries like the United States have sometimes rejected the
conclusion of tax treaties with certain developing countries because those developing
countries may not be willing to introduce provisions (such as limitation of benefit clauses)
that ban tax treaty shopping schemes. This pattern of behaviour does not necessarily deter
United States investment into, say, Latin American countries. For example, there is no tax
treaty between Brazil and the United States of America. However, a US Multinational
enterprise may invest in Brazil via its subsidiary based in, say, the Netherlands within the
framework of the Brazil-Netherlands tax treaty (the United States-Netherlands-Brazil
example).
Finally, Diane Ring has argued that “… the double taxation regime process most closely
mirrors a coordination game. As such, we would expect that agreement would be relatively
easier to achieve because there is no monitoring problem (no need to prevent defection).
The primary challenge in a coordination game is the need to reach a decision that may have
some distributive effect. The greater the distributional component of the coordination game,
the more difficult it is to reach a consensus. Thus, where negotiating countries A and B are
both developed countries with similar investment flows, fewer distributional issues should
arise. If A is a developed country and B a developing country, the selection of regime rules
will carry distributional consequences that will impede agreement”.129
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Ring´s point, according to which the double taxation regime process most closely mirrors a
coordination game, is debatable when applied to the asymmetric tax treaty network. As the
China vs. India example suggests, the strategic interaction among developing countries in
international taxation is a prisoner’s dilemma (rather than a coordination game).130 This
prisoner’s dilemma influences the interaction between developed and developing countries
when concluding asymmetric tax treaties. Indeed, there are competition (rather than
coordination) elements that induce developing countries to include clauses in their
asymmetric tax treaties such as the most favoured nation.131 The presence of these sorts of
competition elements in the asymmetric tax treaty network suggests that the interaction
among developed and developing countries in international taxation is something different
from a coordination game.
In sum, two major conclusions can be reached on Brauner, Dagan, and Ring´s
aforementioned points. First, those points seem to overlook the international tax
competition in which developing countries are involved in international taxation.132 Second,
Brauner´s and Dagan´s points are grounded in a debatable assumption. They both assume
that developing countries´ strategic interaction is static (rather than dynamic). Indeed,
Brauner´s point assumes that it is always good for a representative developing country’s
interest to join the tax treaty network. Conversely, Dagan´s point assumes that that
behaviour is always bad for the interest of a representative developing country. 133
b- The Network Market Explanation
This section elaborates a second reason (compatible with that based on the prisoner’s
dilemma referred to above) for explaining why a representative developing country is
willing to conclude OECD-based tax treaties. According to this second reason, the OECD
model creates a network market of international tax systems that induces developing
countries to join the tax treaty network.
As noted earlier, this section is grounded on the following assumption. Countries are
involved in international tax competition within a compatible standard (rather than between
incompatible standards) in which the compatible standard is the OECD model.
Interestingly, the current international tax competition within a compatible standard seems
to be functionally equivalent to that witnessed in the CD Market. Taxpayers (like users in
the CD market) can interact at a lower transaction cost than would be the case if the
competition were among incompatible standards. Examples of incompatible standards in
the videocassette recorder industry are VHS-Betamax, whereas those of international
taxation are the OECD - Andean models.134

130

See Section III.1.
See Section IV.1.a.
132
Ibidem.
133
See Section IV.1.3 (arguing that the strategic interaction of developing countries in this area is dynamic
(rather than static)).
134
See Section III.3.2.
131

31

This assumption entails two central implications. On the one hand, the OECD-based tax
treaty network is a network market of competing, decentralized international tax systems.
On the other hand, the OECD-based tax treaty network has the standard features of all
network markets: externalities, expectations, and lock-in effects. These three features are
explored independently as follows.
b.1 Network Externalities of the Tax Treaty Network
Network externalities exist when the benefits from a good or service depend on the number
of users of the same good or service. This happens, for example, with telecommunications.
In effect, the value of having a telephone for an individual user depends on the number of
other consumers using compatible telephones.135 Likewise, the benefits for a country
joining the OECD-based tax treaty network depend on the number of countries that are
members of that network. Indeed, the tax treaty network produces positive network
externalities only for those countries (including developing countries) that participate in the
tax treaty network. Following are five examples of positive network externalities of the tax
treaty network.
First, a major set of costs associated with the operation of legal institutions consist is that of
disseminating information about the content of the law among members of society
including foreign investors (communication cost).136 The fact that most tax treaties are
based on the same model and are normally written in the same language (i.e. English) is
instrumental in minimising the communication cost of the tax treaty network.137 Moreover,
the larger the number of countries involved in the tax treaty network, the lower the average
communication cost of the tax treaty network.
Second, another major set of costs associated with the operation of legal institutions are
those costs incurred in the course of applying the law to a particular dispute (enforcement
cost).138 The larger the number of countries involved in the tax treaty network, the lower
the average enforcement cost of a given developing country tax treaty network. For
example, the OECD network market provides developing countries´ domestic courts the
option of minimising enforcement cost by referring to legal sources that are unavailable to
those countries that are outside the tax treaty network. These legal resources include case
law produced by foreign domestic courts interpreting OECD-based tax treaties. For
example, the Supreme Court of Singapore has the option of using the Supreme Court of
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India decision in re Union of India in cases related to tax treaty shopping.139 Needless to
say, this option for minimizing the enforcement cost is unavailable to courts belonging to
countries that are not members of the tax treaty network.140
Third, the OECD-based tax treaty network offers countries a number of procedures for
solving transfer pricing disputes that are normally unavailable to countries that do not
participate in the tax treaty network. A prominent example of this sort of procedure is the
multilateral advance pricing agreement (APA) that is regulated by Article 25 (Paragraph 3)
of the OECD Model.141 An APA is an arrangement that determines, in advance of
controlled transactions, an appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, comparables and
appropriate adjustments thereto, and critical assumptions as to future events) for the
determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a fixed period of time.142
For example, in the early nineties a multilateral APA was successfully issued to solve a
transfer pricing problem relating to the global trading of derivatives and commodities. In
the context of a multilateral APA among tax treaty partners, the US, the UK, and Japan
agreed to develop a profit-split formula for the allocation of income derived from the global
trading of derivatives and commodities (APA on Global Trading).143 The contracting states
considered that the agreed-upon profit-split formula was consistent with the ALS as
codified in Article 9.1 of the relevant tax treaties.144 Needless to say, the APA on Global
Trading would have been more costly to reach in a world without tax treaties. Interestingly,
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courts´ improper behaviour might be more visible to an international audience in the latter case than in the
former.
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developing countries who are members of the tax treaty network (such as China) have
already concluded multilateral APAs.145
Fourth, the secondary adjustment system (SAS) is a bilateral or multilateral procedure that
is normally unavailable to countries that do not participate in the OECD-based tax treaty
network. SAS seeks to minimize international double taxation problems emerging in those
cases of transfer pricing adjustment implemented unilaterally (rather than bilaterally) by a
competent authority.146
Fifth, belonging to the tax treaty network gives its members a reputation of being
committed to keeping their local international tax system consistent with customary
international law (i.e., the international tax regime) for a substantial period of time. Indeed,
the process of termination of a tax treaty is more time consuming than that required for the
abrogation of domestic tax legislation which, in some jurisdictions, can be implemented
overnight.147 Hence, for a developing country to belong to the tax treaty network normally
amounts to a credible commitment to predictability and stability according to well-known
legal norms; that is, those norms based upon the OECD model or compatible models (such
as the UN Model) and their related body of precedent. This argument is functionally
equivalent to the race for predictability and stability theory that has been elaborated to
understand the dynamics of competition among the states in United States of America in
the area of corporate law.148
In short, the OECD-based tax treaty network produces positive network externalities for its
members that are unavailable to non-members. They are the following: i) minimization of
communication and enforcement costs; ii) provision of a number of procedures for
minimising international double taxation, such as the APA and the secondary adjustment
procedure; and iii) credible commitment to predictability and legal stability.
b.2- Expectations for the Tax Treaty Network
A second standard feature of all network markets is expectations. As already noted, the
initial success of the MS-DOS operative system is not normally explained by its technical
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superiority, but rather due to the fact that it was backed by IBM.149 Likewise, the
acceptance of the OECD Model over other available standards by developing countries can
be explained by the fact that the OECD model is sponsored by the world’s most developed
countries that are, not coincidentally, the major capital exporting countries. In sum, the
expectation that the OECD model would prevail over other available standards (such as the
Andean model) is a key element that explains the success of the OECD Model as the core
structure of the international tax regime.
b.3- Lock-in Effect of the Tax Treaty Network
Finally, another key element of all network markets is its lock-in effect. For example, a
better standard that arrives later may be unable to prevail over another, inferior model that
arrived earlier. An instance of this problem is the QWERTY system.150 Likewise, the lockin effect may explain that the fundamental structure of the OECD model is identical to that
designed by the League of Nations Report in 1923 despite the substantial changes that have
occurred in the world economy since then.151
The consequences of the lock-in effect of the OECD model can be witnessed in two
different dimensions. First, it induces other different but compatible standards to be based
on the OECD model and to gradually converge towards the OECD Model (such as the UN
model).152 Second, the lock-in effect of the OECD model is capable of destroying
incompatible standards (such as the Andean Model).153 Both dimensions of the lock-in
effect of the OECD model are outlined as follows.
The UN model is based on the OECD model because, inter alia, the OECD model emerged
earlier. The United Nations Ad Hoc Group of Experts implicitly acknowledged the lock-in
effect of the OECD Model:
“(The) Group of Experts . . . decided to used the OECD Model
Convention as its main reference text in order to take advantage of the
accumulated technical expertise embodied in that Convention and the
Commentary thereon, and also for reasons of practical convenience
stemming from the fact that the Convention was being used by OECD
member countries in the negotiation of tax treaties not only with each
other but also with developing countries.”154

Moreover, the lock-in effect of the OECD model has arguably influenced the evolution of
the UN model over time. This explains, for example, why the UN model is increasingly
similar to the OECD model. As noted earlier, the 2001 version of the UN model is closer
than its 1980 version to the OECD model. 155
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The dynamics of the lock-in effect of the OECD model can also be seen when an
incompatible standard emerges. Indeed, those international tax systems that are
incompatible with the OECD-based international tax regime are normally destroyed
because of that incompatibility. The Andean Model, referred to above, is a case in point. In
effect, the Andean model was eventually defeated by the OECD model because of their
incompatibility.156
In sum, both the line of reasoning grounded on the prisoner’s dilemma and the one on the
network market rationale arguably explain the behaviour of developing countries in
concluding OECD-based tax treaties with developed countries. Neither of these arguments
sheds light on whether this behaviour is consistent with developing countries aggregate
(rather than individual) interests. This is an empirical and dynamic issue. It is an empirical
issue because it requires measuring the cost (e.g. reduction of source taxation triggered by
the prisoner’s dilemma) and benefits (e.g. positive network externalities) faced by
developing countries when joining the tax treaty network. This empirical issue is also
dynamic. The cost/benefit implications of the asymmetric tax treaty network to developing
countries may change over time. It may be cost effective at one time and cost ineffective at
another. 157
V- Tax Treaty Interpretation in Emerging Economies
This Section extends the theory on the emergence of the asymmetric treaty network,
elaborated in the previous sections, to the area of tax treaty interpretation in the developing
world. Three major points are argued.
First, that tax treaty interpretation is a debatable issue mainly because central provisions of
the OECD model are predominantly standards-based (rather than rules-based). Hence, the
precise meaning of those provisions is not certain ex-ante. Their precise meaning can only
be determined ex-post through case law (or something functionally equivalent to case law).
Second, identifying the structure of incentives that courts normally face when solving taxtreaty cases is a relevant element for predicting court decisions given the standard-based
nature of the OECD model.
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This Article assumes that the decision of a representative developing country to join the tax treaty network
is a condition necessary (but not sufficient) for attracting inward FDI. First, this condition is necessary
because of the prisoner’s dilemma and network externalities arguments elaborated above. (A caveat is
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example, inward investment to Argentina shrank dramatically after its 2001 crisis despite the fact there was
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Third, this Section assumes that, ceteris paribus, courts of a representative developing
country have an incentive to construe the OECD-based tax treaties in favour of the
taxpayer, instead of the tax authority, for fear of driving FDI to competing jurisdictions.
Hence, the prisoner’s dilemma and network market arguments referred to above have an
impact on tax treaty interpretation in the developing world. The Union of India case is used
as a case study for grounding this assumption.
1- Standards versus Rules: An Economic Analysis158
Identifying the structure of incentives that courts normally face when solving tax treaty
cases is a relevant element for predicting court decisions given the standard-based nature of
the OECD model. This section aims to demonstrate the said standard (rather than rule)
based nature of the OECD model.
Legal systems must provide information about the legal norms applicable in a given
society. Interestingly, the government can give content to legal norms ex ante (via rules) or
ex post (via standards). Examples of rules and standards can be found in many settings. For
instance, a norm demanding “no driving in excess of 55 miles per hour” is a rule because its
meaning is precise before an individual drives her vehicle. Conversely, the norm “drive
carefully” is a standard because its meaning can be determined ex post via case law only (or
by something functionally equivalent to case law).
Rules and standards differ in at least three important dimensions: (i) cost structure; (ii)
distribution of power within a legal system; and (iii) institutional assumptions. Those three
dimensions will be addressed independently.159
First, rules and standards have different costs of promulgation (i.e. the expenses incurred in
the creation of a norm) and enforcement (i.e. the cost arising from applying a norm to a
given set of facts). On the one hand, rules are normally associated with high promulgation
costs and low enforcement costs. An example of a rule is a precise tax norm that clearly
specifies ex ante the taxpayer’s expected behaviour. Hence, rules are expensive to create,
but relatively cheap to apply given their largely self-enforcing character. 160 On the other
hand, standards are normally associated with low promulgation costs and high enforcement
costs. An instance of a standard is the arm’s length approach. Its precise meaning can only
be provided ex post via case law. 161 Therefore, the enforcement cost of standards is high
vis-à-vis its promulgation cost.
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Second, rules and standards imply differing institutional allocations of power. While rules
are usually a centralised creation of the legislative branch of government, standards are a
decentralised creation of the law through, paradigmatically, the judiciary.
Finally, standards and rules have different institutional assumptions. Standards (unlike
rules) presuppose a legal system capable of producing case law with public good features.
Standards therefore require a higher threshold of human capital endowments than rules
within the legal system in which they operate (such as competent lawyers and judges).
2- The OECD Model: A Standard-Based Regime
This Section identifies the structure of the OECD model using the rule/standard distinction
as a theoretical framework. It argues that the central norms of the OECD model are
fundamentally standards-based (rather than rules-based). That is, the full meaning of the
central norms of the OECD model can be provided ex post by case law only (or by
something functionally equivalent to case law). Articles 9.1 and 3.2 are used as examples
for grounding this proposition.
a- The Cases of Articles 3.2 and 9.1: Standard-based Norms
The OECD model regulates the transfer pricing problem through two separate provisions.
Article 7 addresses that problem in the context of permanent establishments, whereas
Article 9.1 focuses on the transfer pricing problem in the context of associated enterprises.
Article 9.1 states the following:
“Associated Enterprises
1. Where
a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the
management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, or b) the
same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise
of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State, and in either case conditions
are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which
differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which
would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those
conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.”

Article 9.1 embodies a norm that has the following logical structure:
1) If associated enterprises conclude a transfer price;
2) And that transfer price is not consistent with the arm’s length standard (ALS); then
3) The tax authority may adjust that transfer price to make it consistent with the ALS.
Interestingly, the OECD model does not provide an ex ante meaning for two
fundamental elements of Article 9.1: neither “associated enterprise” nor “ALS” is
defined by the OECD model. Article 3.2 governs those situations where terms are not
defined in the OECD model in order to solve the interpretative problem of norms
without ex ante meaning. Article 3.2 states the following:
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“As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a Contracting
State, any term not defined there in shall, unless the context otherwise
requires, have the meaning that it has at that time under the law of that State
for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies, any meaning
under the applicable tax laws of that State prevailing over a meaning given to
the term under other laws of that State.”

The logical structure of Article 3.2 is the following:
1) If a term is not defined in the OECD model;
2) And the context does not otherwise require; then
3) The meaning of that term will be provided by domestic law of Contracting States.
Article 3.2 of the OECD model has a mixed character. It consists of a rule embedded in a
standard. In effect, the rule (“undefined terms must be defined by contracting states’
domestic law”) is subject to the standard (“unless the context otherwise requires”). Article
3.2 has, therefore, a prevailing standard-based nature because only case law can provide a
meaning for the standard “unless the context otherwise requires.” In sum, both Article 9.1
and Article 3.2 have a standards-based (rather than a rules-based) structure because they
lack a precise ex ante meaning.
b- Main Assumption of the OECD Model: a Decentralised Network of Domestic Courts
Capable of Producing Case Law with Public Good Features
The previous Section has shown that two central norms of the OECD model (i.e., Articles
3.2 and 9.1) have standard-based features. Other prominent examples of OECD norms that
are of a standard-based nature include the following, for reasons similar to those identified
when analysing Articles 3.2 and 9.1: agent of independent status (Article 5.6), beneficial
owner (Articles 10, 11 and 12), and royalties (Article 12).162
The standard-based structure of the OECD model is significant as it shows that the OECD
model is grounded on a crucial institutional assumption. The OECD model assumes that the
content of its norms will be fundamentally provided by a network of decentralised domestic
courts via case law of a public good nature.163 The standard-based nature of the OECD
model explains why tax treaty interpretation is not like mathematics. Courts normally have
room in construing tax treaties that they can take into account strategic considerations as
the Union of India case shows.164
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3- The Union of India Case: a Possible Alternative Decision
a- Incentives Matter in Tax Treaty Interpretation in Emerging Countries
The Union of India is a paradigmatic case of tax treaty shopping.165 The taxpayer had
designed a triangular tax planning scheme for channelling FDI from the relevant OECD
countries into India via the Mauritius-India tax treaty (rather than channelling them from an
OECD country to India). According to the Supreme Court of India, the taxpayer’s main
goal in this case was to achieve an international double non-taxation result. The Supreme
Court of India decided the case in favour of the taxpayer.
As seen, the Supreme Court of India construed one tax treaty (the Indo-Mauritius tax
treaty) in light of another tax treaty (the Indo-US tax treaty).166 This inter-textual method
of interpretation seems compelling. However, there are other equally compelling legal
arguments that could have led to an opposing result, that is, in favour of the tax authority
(instead of the taxpayer). One argument that may have led to a result in favour of the tax
authority is the following.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties (VCLT) sets forth the
general rule of treaty interpretation. It prohibits the use of unilateral documents for
construing treaties.167 The commentary to Article 31 rejects the interpretative value of
unilateral documents as follows: “The principle on which this provision is based is that a
unilateral document cannot be regarded as forming part of the ´context´ within the
meaning of Article 31 […]”. Hence, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention forbids
construing a treaty signed between A and B (first treaty) in light of a treaty concluded
between A with C (second treaty). This is because the second treaty should be considered
as a unilateral document in relation to the first treaty, given that C did not take part in the
treaty concluded between A and B. In sum, the second treaty should be irrelevant for
construing the first treaty according to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.
The reasoning outlined in the previous paragraph is arguably crucial to the Union of India
case. There is no evidence in the Union of India decision that Mauritius had accepted in
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any way the Indo-US tax treaty.168 Thus, the Indo-US tax treaty should be treated as a
unilateral document in relation to the Indo-Mauritius tax treaty, and, as such, should be
immaterial for construing the Indo-Mauritius tax treaty.
In sum, incentive matters in tax treaty interpretation given the standard (rather than rule)
based structure of tax treaties based on the OECD model. The incentive structure for
developing countries referred to above169 seems to be an instrumental element in predicting
their decisions in tax treaty cases because courts normally have enough room to choose
between competing (sometimes opposing) constructions equally consistent with the Vienna
Convention of the Law of Treaties and Article 3.2 of the OECD model. The Union of India
case suggests that developing countries´ courts – consistent with the individual interest of
their own countries - are influenced by the prisoner’s dilemma and network externalities
previously mentioned.170 Hence, this paper assumes that developing countries’ courts have
the incentive to construe the local tax treaty network in the foreign direct investment arena
in favour of the taxpayer (rather than the tax authority) for fear of driving this investment to
competing jurisdictions if all other conditions are equal.
VI. Conclusion
This Article offers an answer to two fundamental questions on the emergence and evolution
of the asymmetric tax treaty network that represents, for example, over 50% of the United
States and United Kingdom tax treaty networks. First, it elaborates a theory for explaining
why a representative developing country is willing to conclude tax treaties with developed
countries on the basis of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital
(OECD model). Second, this Article extends that theory to tax treaty interpretation in the
developing world. This extension aims to illuminate the structure of incentives the courts of
a representative developing country normally have when construing OECD-based tax
treaties in the foreign direct investment (FDI) area. Game theory is used as a theoretical
framework for answering both questions.
This Article‘s analysis is premised on the following three major assumptions. First,
developing countries are habitually engaged in international tax competition within a
compatible standard (rather than between incompatible standards). The current compatible
standard is the OECD model, which channels international tax competition into areas that
are not regulated by the OECD Model, such as the inclusion of clauses like most–favourednation in asymmetric tax treaties.171 Second, the OECD-based tax treaty network is a
network market of decentralized international tax regimes that has the standard features of
all network markets: externalities, expectations, and lock-in effects. 172 Third, it is also
assumed that the OECD model compatible standard is capable of destroying incompatible
168
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standards (such as the Andean Model)173 and inducing other, different, but compatible
standards (like the United Nations model) to gradually converge towards the OECD Model.
The Article argues that a representative developing country has the incentive to conclude
tax treaties with developed countries for two different, but compatible, central reasons.
First, there is a prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries in the arena of foreign
direct investment (FDI) that induces developing countries to follow the OECD model for
fear of driving FDI to competing jurisdictions if all other conditions are equal.174 Second,
the OECD model produces a network market of international tax systems that has the
standard features of all network markets. For example, the OECD-based network market of
international tax systems conveys positive network externalities only to those countries
(including developing countries) that are members of this network.175
Both the point grounded on the prisoner’s dilemma and the one on the network market
rationale arguably explain the behaviour of developing countries in concluding OECDbased tax treaties with developed countries. Neither of these points sheds light on whether
this behaviour is consistent with developing countries aggregate (rather than individual)
interests. This is an empirical and dynamic issue.176 It is an empirical issue because it
requires measuring the cost (e.g. reduction of source taxation triggered by the prisoner’s
dilemma) and benefits (e.g. positive network externalities) faced by developing countries
when joining the tax treaty network. This empirical issue is also dynamic. The cost/benefit
implications of the asymmetric tax treaty network to developing countries may change over
time. It may be cost effective at one time and cost ineffective at another time.177
Finally, this Article extends the theory on the emergence of the asymmetric tax treaty
network to the area of tax treaty interpretation by developing countries´ courts. It assumes
that developing countries´ courts – consistent with the individual interest of their own
countries - are influenced by the prisoner’s dilemma and network externalities referred to
above. Hence, developing countries courts have the incentive to construe the local tax
treaty network in the foreign direct investment arena in favour of the taxpayer (rather than
the tax authority) for fear of driving investment to competing jurisdictions if all other
conditions are equal. This strategic construction of the asymmetric tax treaty network is
facilitated by the standard (rather than rule) character of the OECD model. The Union of
India case recently decided by the Indian Supreme Court is used as a case study.178
In sum, the emergence of the asymmetric tax treaty network since the early 1960´s is not a
miracle but rather an intelligible, but sometimes failed, attempt to solve problems arising
from the strategic interactions among nations for the division of the international tax
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base.179 It remains to be seen if the emergence of the OECD Model itself (and its
predecessors) is a miracle.
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